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STATKMEN1 ()I1JI lilSDICTION
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. $ 7S-2a-5(2)(j).
STATEMENT OK ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Was the trial court correct in determining that the Cit\ "s interpretation and
application id' the nonconforming use amortization provisions of its ordinance was not
arhitrary. capricious or illegal.
Stanjjard.of_re\je_w: This court reviews decisions of local administrative officials as
though the decision came directly to it rather than on appeal from the trial court and
addresses only whether die decision was arbitrary, capricious or illegal. A..g.. Rogers w
\Vest_Valley City. 2006 UT App 3(12. 11 12. 142 P.3d 554, 55h; Utah Code Ann.
cj l()-9a-S01 (3 I. I he City's interpretation of its ordinances is re\ iewed for correctness,
affording "Mime level of non-binding deference to the interpretation ad\anced hv the
local agency." Carrier v. Salt Fake County. 2004 IT 9ST1 28. 104 PA1 1208. 12b
(rejecting non-deferential standard in Brow n v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment. 957 P.2d
207 (Utah App. 1998)). The standard for arbitrary or capricious is the substantial
evidence standard. Biadlevw Pa\son City Corp.. 2003 UT 10, «i 15. 70 P.3d 47. 37.
Pj^sejyatjo_n: Ihis issue was preserved in the City's memorandum in support of its
motion for summary judgment. (R. 540-548.)
2. Did the trial court properly conclude that all o( the issues raised hv MtvS. in
tins consolidated action, which had not otherwise been rendered moot, were appropriately
resol\edh\ the City's motion for summan judgment1.'
Sjamjard.of review: lhe trial court's ruling was based upon re\iew of the applicable
piocedural posture of the case, the relevant undisputed facts, and application of the law to
those lacts. Under that situation, considerable deference and discretion are afforded to
the Trial court. Mcnzies v. Galetka. 200b UT 81. 11 58, P.3d
Preservation: 1he issue was raised in M&S's opposition to Pro\o City's proposed
summary judgment order. Fhe City responded to that objection. (R. 1155-1 161.) 'Fhe
trial court denied NLVS's objection by Memorandum Decision dated April 4. 2006 (R.
I 198-1202).
5. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in graining lea\e to intervene in the
matter below?
Standard of levicvv: A trial court's ortler granting inter\ eniion is re\ iewed only for "a
clear abuse of discretion." State ex rel. Pcpt. of Soc. Sens, v. Sucec. 924 P.2d 882, 887
(Utah 1996).
Preservation: Fhe Cilv did not oppose the intervention. Vl<v:S has preserved that issue for
appeal and the City leels obliged to respond to its arguments.
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION. STATUTES.
ORIHNAM USANPRULUS
Provo City ('ode § 14.30.090. Termination of Nonconforming Uses - Recovery of
Investment.
(1) 'Fhe Community Development Director or his designee shall
grant an owner of properly affected by Subsection 14.30.080(2) of this
Chapter an extension of the lime required to con orm with such section if:
(.i) the ow ner:
(i) by August 4. 2000 files a notice of intent to apply
for a lime extension as provided in this section: and
(ii) by April 4, 2001 files a complete application for an
extension ol time as provided in this section.
(b) (he owner's application for an extension of time
demonstrates by a preponderance of evidence thai:
(f) the nonconforming use which is the subject ol the
application was legally established: and
(ii) subject to the \'oiinula in Subsection (2) of ibis
section, die owner is unable to receiver prior to April 4, 2003
the amount of the ow icr's investment in the propcrlv.
(2) (a) I he lime period during which an owner may
reco\er the amount of his investment in property affected by
Section 14.50.080(2) of this Chapter shall be determined by
dividing Ihe residual value of the property bv die average
monthly net income from the property. The"resulting ftgure is
the number of months which die owner shall have io recover
his investment in the property.
(b) For the purposes oi this subsection, the follow ing
delinilions shall apply:
(i) "Amount ol'the owner's investment" means the
adjusted present \ alue o\ the property as oi' April 4. 2000.
(ii) "Adjusted present \alue" means a property's
original purchase price plus any capital improvements and
less depreciation and net income from the property, all as
adjusted for inflation to April 4. 2000.
(iii) ""Compliance value" means the appraised \alue ol'
the property on April 4, 2000 based upon compliance with die
requirements of this Chapter.
li\ ) "Residual \alue" means the difference between a
propcrh 's adjusted present value and its compliance \alue as
of April 4. 2000.
(c) 'Fhe time period determined under subsection (a) of this
section shall apply to the pronertv for which the owner made an
application for extension and to the owner's successors, if any. until
such time period has run.
(3) Any person aggrieved by a decision iA' the ('ommunitv
Development Director or his designee applying this section mav apnea
such decision to the Board of Adjustment as provided in Chapter 14.0;
this Title.
it
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(4) Fhe Community Development Director may adopt reasonable
regulations to carry out the purpose of this section.
STATEMENT OE TilE.CASK
A. NATURE OF THE ( ASK
Ihis matter arises from the Cit\ 's legislative enactment of a text amendment to its
zoning ordinances affecting properties owned by the appellants (eo!leeti\el> ".\U\:S*").
I he amendment changed portions ot'lhe Cil> 's Supplemental Residential ("S") ()verla\
zoning provisions to permit accessory apartments in single family residential zones
subject to a requirement that the primary poition of the dwelling be occupied hv the
property owner. Prior to the amendment, there had been no owner occupancy
requirement. \LV_S filed ibis action in which it asserted facial and as-applied challenges
to that text amendment.
.Along with the text amendment, the City enacted an amortization period
exempting for a fixed period of time application oi' the owner occupancy requirement to
allow opportunity, to recoup investments in the affected properties. MAiS applied for an
amortization determination, arguing that it was entitled to an infinite period of
amortization. Not salislicd with the City's decision on amortization. VUV'S filed a second
lawsuit seeking judicial re\ iew of the City's decision. I hose two eases were eventually
consolidated by stipulation of the parties.
|{. COURSE OEPROC EEIMNOS
M&S brought a facial and as-applied challenge to the City's texi amendments to its
S Overlay provisions. Fhe ('itv responded bv filing a motion for summary judgment
arguing that the facial challenge failed as a matter of law and that M&S had not sought
nor obtained a ruling on the amortization of its investment in the properties, therein'
failing to exhaust its administrative remedies for an as-applied challenge. A facial
challenge to the amendments had also been advanced in a separate lawsuit filed bv
another party, and while the City's summary judgment motion was pending, had been
appealed to the Supreme Court. "Fhe parties therefore agreed to stay these proceedings
pending appellate resolution of the facial challenge.
In Anderson v. Piano City Oorpe. 2005 UT 5. IOS P.3d 701. the Supreme Court
upheld the City's enactment of the text amendment reqi iring owner occupancy for the
accessory use. In addition, ii rejected the constitutional challenges also asserted by \Uv_S.
During the interim, M&S sought an amoriizalion determination from the Cilv.
Pvaluating the information submitted by \hx:S, the Citv granted it a 22-\ear 3-month
period lor amortization ol" its investment, exempting it from the owner occupancy
requirement for that period. \hv_S challenged thai decision before the Cil\ 's Hoard of
Adjustment which afPrmed (he amortization determination. M&S then filed the second
action whieh presented a petition for review pursuant to Utah Code .Ann. § 10-0-708.'
The trial court consolidated the two cases based upon agreement o\' the parties that the
'The statutory review has been repealed and reenacted as Utah Code Ann.
§ 10-()a-S01. 'Fhe reenacted statute has retrospective application as a matter o\~ law. Mr
H.A.M. Dev.. I..1..C. v. Salt Pake County. 2000 UT 2. 11 21. 128 P.3d 1Ibl. 1loo -1 107
(addressing Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-801 which contains identical language).
two cases had common lacis and issues <q' law. \\ bile all of this was going on. neighbors
in the area filed a motion to intervene which the court granted.
After consolidation, the Citv filed a motion lor summary judgment with the
understanding that '"all that remains in this consolidated action is the as-applied challenge
whieh has been distilled into the issue of wheiher the City's amortization determination
was arbitrary, capricious i^v illegal." (R. 5007) NhviS subsequently tiled a cross-motion
for summary judgment. (R. 573.) .After heating oral arguments, the court entered a
memorandum decision on January 30. 2000. (R. I 14 1-1 143.) Fhe court concluded that
the amortization ordinance use of "lime period" did not allow it to be construed to permit
an indeUnite amortization period. (R. 1145.1 fhe Court then held that the Citv "s
approach to amortization yielding the 22-\car 3-month amortization "is reasonable
because it allows a sufficient period for Plaintiffs (sic] to recoup its investment in the
propem while satisfying the purpose of the Ordinance of e\entually ending all
nonconforming uses/' (R. 1144.)
Per instruction from the court, the Citv prepared a summary judgment and order oi'
dismissal. Consistent with the City's understanding and that of the trial court that all
issues \\ ere addressed by the application o\ the amortization provisions, the Order
dismissed all claims of M&S in the consolidated matter. M&S objected, arguing that it
had remaining as-applied challenges which had not been addressed by the Court. The
City responded, arguing that the issues had been distilled into the amortization
determination and that the law applicable to the as-applied claims would dictate judgment
against \li\iS on those as-applied challenges.
On April 4. 2006, the court entered its Memorandum Decision overruling MecS's
objections to the proposed order, noting thai "M&S's facial and as-applied ehalleng.es
ha\e already been adjutlicaled by this Court when this Court granted summaiv judgment
m favor of the City. There is nothing left for this Court to decide in the matter." <R.
1201-02.) Fhe court also noted that \I\:S had sufficient opportuniu to advance any other
claims it thought it had and that the court had ruled on the basis that the claims had been
consolidated, thai the sole issue remaining for decision vvas the amortization issue and
that MoeS had failed to argue any other issues in its memoranda or at oral argument. (R.
1200-01.) M&S did not seek post-judgment relief under either Rule 50 or Rule 00, Utah
R.Civ.P.
C. STATKMKNTOM<\ACTS
On April 4. 2000. the City adopted Ordinance 2000-15 which implemented a text
amendment to its zoning ordinance by imposing a restriction on accessory apartment uses
within the S 0\erlav zone requiring owner occupancy oi' the primary part oi the dwelling.
Ordinance 2000-15 also provided for an exemption from the owner occupancy
lequirement during an amortization period. 'Fhe amortization provisions are contained in
the Provo City Code as § 14.30.001).
\I.x:S formally submitted an application for deteimination of the application period
applicable to its property on March 20. 2002. (R. 0500-0537.) In its application. M&S
iclied on its net rental incomes, after depreciation, to conclude that the net rental income
will always be a negative value and therefore requested that it should be entitled to an
"infinite number of months to recover its investment . . ." (R. 0534.)
Using values supplied by M&S before depreciation and adjusting them for
inflation to April 4. 2000. the City calculated the amortization period under $ 14.50.000
as being 22.11 years. (R.0503-0507.) Community Development Director Gary McGinn
advised M&S of the amoitization results by letter dated March 0. 2004. In that letter, he
advised that the amortization period was 22 years and 3 months and noted that M&S had
already benefitted from three years of recoupment from April 4. 2000, to April 4. 2003.
(R.050I.)
Mt^S disagreed with the amortization determination and filed an appeal with the
Hoard of Adjustment on March IS. 2004. (R. 490.) On appeal. M&S argued that though
s> 14.30.000 uses the term "net income." it docs not deli ic that term, it further argued
that the City used two inconsistent definitions of "net income" in its amortization
analysis. M&S concluded that had its actual income for the period through April 4. 2000.
been used, application oi the formula established b\ >j 14.30.000 would have \ ielded an
infinite amortization period. (R. 4N5-4()7.)
I he Cit\ "s memorandum to the Board addressed the legal issues of statutory
construction and reasonableness of the Cit\ "s amortization determination. It pointed out
that the Hoard7s decision must be made based on whether substantial evidence existed to
support the amoriizalion decision. (R. 477-4S3.) fhe City discussed the Citv Council's
legislative iir.ent to eventually eliminate non-owner occupied appurtenant apartment uses
in the S Overla\ zone and to provide amortization as relief to those who had substantial
in\ estment in the preexisting apartment uses, p pointed out that amortization, b\
definition, cannot be infinite. It also discussed the basis for the underlying decision not to
rely on income figures during the period when the property was in major reconstruction
and the other considerations gi\en in support of M&S's valuation and income figures.
[id.) I he City then discussed the issue of "net income" with regard to the choice bv MAeS
not to charge fair rental value for the apartments.
In our case, to allow M&S to avoid the application of the ordinance
because it charges little or no actual rent is inconsistent with the clear
intent of the city council to encourage owner occupied homes. "Fhe
term average net income can be easily interpreted to mean a fair
rental value for the property.
(R.47S.)
Ihe M\:S appeal came before the Board of Adjustment on May 20. 200i. (R.
450-475.) .After the hearing, the Hoard entered findings of fact including;
o. MiScS Investments PPC. made a timely application for an
extension of time. However. M&S Inveslments LLC. did not request
a specific amount oi time to come into compliance with the owner
occupancy; it requested infinity.
0. 'Fhe Community Development Director determined that an
extension oi 22 years and 3 months was warranted. 'Phis
determination was made based on the assumption of an a\erage
monthly net rental income at lair market value.
7. 14.30 does not define avciage moullifi net rental income.
S. 14.30.000(4) allows Ihe Community Development Director to
adopt reasonable regulations in determining the length of an
extension ol time to come into compliance.
0. Since average monthly net rental income is not defined, it was
reasonable for llie Community Development Director lo interpret
average monthly net rental income as being fair market value.
(R. 440-d IS.) 'Fhe Hoard denied the appeal and affirmed the amortization decision of the
Community Development Director. (Id.)
SlI]VI\1AKY()KA_R(»l]\!.KN,r
It is important at the outset to dispel any impression hat the Cilv and M&S had
reached a settlement agreement. 'Fhe alleged settlement is not relevaiil or materia! lo any
oi' the issues belore the C'ourt and appears to be bandiet. about solely for purposes of
portraying the City as somehow having acted in bad faith in its dealings with M&S. It is
well established law that a settlement may be entered into only after approval b\ the
municipality's governing body. The record establishes that (I) the Citv"s legal counsel
lacked authority to enter into a binding settlement agreement; and (2) the settlement
discussions were just thai, discussions. This was made clear lo counsel for M&S in terms
nobody could misunderstand. It is significant thai \K\:S look no steps to enforce the
alleged settlement. The reason is clear: there was no settlement agreement.
Fhe Hoard of Adjustment decision is reviewed to determine whether it is arbitrary,
capricious or illegal, with a statutory presuniplion of va idity. 'Fhe arbilrarv or capricious
standard simply requires substantial evidence. It does not. as argued bv M&S before the
trial court, require a preponderance of the evidence. Substantial evidence is simply thai
quantum of evidence necessary to convince a reasonable peison to support a conclusion.
'Fhe law affords the Hoard considerable deference and prohibits a reviewing court from
substituting its judgment lor that of the Board or independently weighing the e\ idence
before the Hoard.
1lere. the e\ idence is contained in the record and was largely supplied by \Lv.S.
Fhe Board carefully weighed and considered the evidence before concluding that the
City's application of the ordinance was reasonable and was supported bv substantial
evidence in the record before it. Applying the correct standard of review, the trial court
agreed.
The arguments advanced by M&S before the City, the trial court and here suffer
irom several fundamental flaws. Fwo are paiticularlv obvious. Firs!, bv definition, an
amortization period for a nonconforming use cannot be infinite. MtViS is not challenging
the dillerence between a 20-year amortization and a 50-year or 40-vear amortization. It
stridently insists it is entitled to perpetually avoid the clear legislative intent to establish
ow ner occupancy in single family residential dwellings with appurtenant apartments.
Closeh related is M&S's continued insistence that it is entitled to first claim depreciation
lor lax puiposes and use that depreciated number for amoriizalion purposes. This ignore
the fact that depreciation and amortization are roughly equivalent terms. To permit M&S
:o recoup its investmenl by way of depreciation over a fixed period and vet have an
infinite amortization period also for recoupment of its investment ignores the underlving
purpose oi'the amortization provisions of the ordinance, which is the eventual elimination
of the nonconforming use. Simply stated, the Citv has attempted to reach a reasonable
result while NLVS insists on the unreasonable.
It is clear from the record that both the City and the trial court reasonably believed
that all issues in this consolidated action had been distilled into the amortization question
and could be disposed oi on cross motions for summary judgment. It is difficult to
determine lrom the record how \LVS can now assert that it has somehow preseived any
odier as-applied challenges. Fhe trial court appropriately ruled on that as-applied
challenge in favor of the City and brought the matter to a close. XLVS should be estopped
lrom claiming that those claims continue.
'S
fhe challenge lo the court's order graining inlerv eniion serves no real purpose.
The Irial court has considerable discretion in deciding whether lo perml a parly to
intervene and that discretion is reviewable only for clea' abuse ol discretion. M&S has
not demonstrated any such clear abuse. Moreover. M&S's argumenls arc based upon the
nonexistent settlement agreement. While settlement negotiations terminated alter the
inlerveulion. that is not a sufficient basis for finding an abuse of discretion in granting the
motion to intervene. If an enforceable settlement agreement had been reached,
intervention would have been meaningless and it would have been error to grant it. Thai
is not the case here. "Fhe matter had not been settled. Lven if there were an error in
granting intervention, there is no legal prejudice to M&S. and the error would be
harmless. While this Court is free to evaluate the challenge to intervention, there is no
relief it can grant which has anv significance.
'Fhe decisions by the Hoaid of Adjustment and the trial court which undeilie this
appeal were valid and correct as a matter of law. It is appropriate for this Court to affirm
those decisions.
argument
1. t11lrk was no skt1 llmkm agrklmlist isltwkln tiik
PARTILS.
M&S insinuates the alleged settlement issue into many of the issues, facts and
arguments throughout its brief, This could easily he viewed as or interpreted as a
transparent attempt to prejudice this C'ourt by introducing bias against the Cilv or finding
injury based upon the trial court's decision, lo grant the motion to intervene. MtViS makes
no effort to recognize the extent or nature of the settlement negotiations, it boldly treats
the negotiations as a final and binding settlement agieeinent. I here are many such
statements throughout the brief, but a few will sul lice to illustrate. In its second issue for
review. MeiS questions whether the trial court erred "in granting Intcrvenors Motion to
Intervene, thereby overriding the settlement agreement agreed lo between the Coxes and
Provo City 7" (Aplfis Brief p. 1.) in its statement of facts it states that .M&S and Provo
City agreed to the terms of a settlement ..." (A pit's Brief *" 12. p. b.) In its summary of
its argument. MttS states that "|a|fter retracting from ils agreed-upon settlement the Citv
then misapplied its owner occupant ordinance." (A pit's Brief, p. 17.) 1hese and other
statements go beyond mere advocacy; they brazenly misstate the facts.
It is interesting to note that, despite its position that the Cilv entered into an
agreement with \LVS. il made no effort at any time :o enforce the alleged settlement
agreement. I his is because NKVS knew there was no settlement agreement.
When settlement negotiations began in November of 2002. the Citv's counsel sent
to counsel for MAcS a "Confidential Rule 4()S Settlement Communication." (I etter from
Jody K Burnett to Keith A. Call, dated November 20. 2002. R. 020-023. copy enclosed at
Addendum I.) Fhe conditional nature of the negotiations was emphasized in that letter.
In furtherance of that [negotiated resolution] effort. I am forwarding
on behalf of Provo (Itv an outline oi the conceptual framework for"a
settlement agreement, it is important to bear in mind that at this
point this islargely my work product. As you arc undoubtedly
aware, any binding agreement must ultimately be approved through
appropriate channels bv Provo City. Iloweve'r. in my experience? the
only realistic way to achieve that goal is to try and negotiate the
terms of a mutually acceptable t.ej^MiyiLilglce.uient subject to formal
approval. " ~~^
tR. 932. L-mphasis added).
In April of 2003. MiV_S insisted that "the material terms of our settlement have
already been agreed upon, and will be enforceable in court." (R. 901.] 1hat position is
simply contrary to Utah law. See P^iUerson v. American Fork Cilv. 2003 UT 7. '1 13. 07
P.3d 4(>o. 470-71. In frudersiin. a developer had arguably negotiated a settlemeni with the
citv's \ lav or. "1 he court held that whatever agreement there may have been with the
Mayor simply was not enough. Id.
Nothing in the record suggests that the American Pork Citv Council
ev er voted on or approved a binding settlement agreement'. Though
Pattersons may have engaged in lengthy negotiations with Mavor"
BarraU, the Mayor docs^im_hayc..the authority to bind the City"
Council . . . ,\t most. Pattersons have shown that lhe\~attempted to
reach a conciliation with the City through the Mayor's office, but
this alone docs not create a binding contract.
PaUerson_ 1! 13 at 470-71 (emphasis added).
Nor should MSiS anil their counsel have continued to believe there was an
enforceable selilement. ('oiinsel for the City responded to the April letter on May 7.
2003, emphasizing the lack of an agreement.
This response is intended to both set the record straight with respect
to our position on the status of negotiatioi s and seek clarification oi
your client's position and intended course of action.
As 1 have repeatedly advised you, both orally and in writing, while
we have appreciated you and \our client's w illingness to engage in a
constructive dialogue intended lo explore a possible selilement of
this case, we have not reached a selilement agreement as of this time.
Fhe cursory analysis in vour letter of April 24, 3003. conveniently
omits reference to my letter of November 20, 2002 ... in which 1
specifically advised you thai "any binding agreement must ultimately
be approved through appropriate channels by Provo Cilv." . . .
. . . Unlike the case citations you provided in vour letter of April 24.
2003, there are no written communications between counsel agreeing
to the material terms of settlement in this case. Quite to the contrary.
that continues to be the specific focus oi" cur discussion. Moreover,
the more complicated decision making process and statutory
authority lo bind local government requires a completely dil'ferenl
analysis than in the case of private parlies.
(Letter from Jody K Burnett to Keith A. Call, daled Mav 7, 3003. R. S0S-S00. copy
enclosed as Addendum 2.)
M&S maintained ils position that there had been a selilement through the hearing
before the trial court. Ihe Citv's counsel was again forced to explain.
A lot of that information isn't, not only is not relevant or material but
frankly some of it alludes to Rule 40S settlemeni negotiations. And
if\ou actually read those letters. I didifiI bother to move lo strike
them, bul you'll see certain!)' in mv letters the usual caveat or
qualiliet that it ain't a deal until it's voted on by the citv council in
an open and public meeting. And I don't purport to have that
authority and nobody voted me as a representative of the Provo (liv
counsel |sic[. I'm just ihe attorney Irymg lo advocate their interests
in this ease. So I'm sure the court is not persuaded bv die notion that
there was sort of tentative negotiations not ever approved by Ihe
council in open and public meeting.
(R. 1214, T. 14:0-10.)
The law is clear on this point. There is no enforceable settlemeni agreement.
II. Ill K BOARD OF ADJUSTMENTS DECISION ON THK
AMORTIZATION RULING BY THK CUV WAS NOT ARBITRARY,
CAPRICIOUS OR ILLLOAL.
A. THK CORRLCT STANDARD OP RKVIKW IS MORK
DKLLRKNHAL THAN M&S AUOUKS.
Mtv:S argued insistently to the trial court that the standard applicable to the
arbitrary and capricious determination was a preponderance of evidence standard.
(R. 1214.1". 10-12.) In its reph argument. MiViS ad\ anced the standard as one solely oi
illegality in which the court affords the City no deference to the interpretation of the
ordinance. (R. 1214. T. 22-24.) As recognized bv the trial court, neither is correct.
(R. 1 140.)
All administrative and quasi-judicial decisions on zoning law involve the
application of ordinances lo specific facts. It is this application of ordinances, as in the
amortization decision at issue here, which is subject to the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review. In thai review, courts afford board of adjustment decisions
substantial deference. Patterson _\. Ul;dil1njiUyJid,.of Adjustment. S03 P.2d o()2. 603
(Utah App. 1903). See (//so C^oiTi^v-yopdJJcig^ 303
P.3d 13S. 140 (Utah 1970) (stating that in zoning decisions local administrative bodies
"should be allowed a comparative!) wide latitude of discretion.") Courts also do not
substitute their judgment for that o[' the local board of adjustment. Patterson at 004.
It does not matter whether the court agrees or disagrees with the
rationale of Ihe Board or the policy grounds upon which a decision is
based. It does not lie within the prerogative of the court to substitute
its judgment for that oi the Board. Thus, courts will not consider the
wisdom. necessity, or advisability of the Board's determination.
Patterson at 004 n. 5 (punctuation, citations omitted).
\\ hether the Board's decision was arbitrary or capricious turns on whether there is
substantial evidence in the record to suppoit thai decision. Bradley v. Pawm (Ity Coip..
2003 U 1 lo. <f 13, 70 P.3d 47. 37 (quasi-judicial decisions are subject lo the substantial
ev idenee standard for arbitrariness or capriciousness).
Substantial evidence is that quantum and quality of relevant evidence
that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a
conclusion. II is more than a mere scintilla oi evidence though
something less than ihe weight of the evidence.
Patterson at 604 n.O (punctuation, citations omitted). Courts ""simply determine, in light
of the evidence before the Board, whether a reasonable mind could reach the same
conclusion as the Board. It is not our prerogative to we gh the evidence anew." Patterson
at 004 (citation omitted).
To the extent thai interpretation o( an ordinance is involved, the Cilv is also
at forded some degree ol delerence in ils interpretation. Fhe Supreme Court has
pronounced that local interpretations of ordinances shot Id be rev ievved for correctness
while affording "some level of non-binding deference to Ihe interpretation advanced b\
the local agency." Carrier v. Salt Pake County. 200 I li F OS. 11 2S, 104 P.3d I208. 1210.
M&S also argues here that the amortization ordinance should be strictly construed
against ihe Cilv and in ils favor. 'I hat is inconsistent willi the deference affouled by the
Carrjer court. That strict construction also does not apply to construction of ordinances
related to nonconforming uses.
[T]his rule of construction favoring the free use of land should, not be
iippht-ld where common sense indicates the result would be contrived,
unreasonable, or absurd ___l>_.c.w <\ftjie_ni_a_iiifes;t object and.nurpo.se
od Ihe.ordinance.
1 Zieglcr. RathkopPs the I.aw of Zoning and .Pla.n_i_i.iiig 04th ed. 1900) Jj 5 14 at 3-34
(emphasis added). Fhe reason for Ibis approach with respect to nonconforming uses is
that the goal is to eventually eliminate those uses.
Consistent with this policy of restriction a id eventual elimination,
the conns have ruled that the right of nonconforming use should be
stiictly consiiued. Such use should be lesincted. decreased, and
finally eliminated.
1 Young, Anderson's American 1au__o___/oniii» (4 ed. iOOo) § d.()7 at 3004)1.
Consistent with these authorities, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that
"'regulations governing nonconforming uses ar_c__i_\cepteTfmm_ Ihe general rule that
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zoning ordinances should be strictly construed in favor of the property owner." Outdoor
Swems^Inc. v,( 1ty_of_Mcsa. S19 P.3d 44. 30 (Ariz. 1991).
In summary, the appropriate review here is to determine if there is substantial
ev idenee supporting the City's amortization determination, affording some deference to
the (Ity's interpretation of its ordinances and keeping in mind the clear leeislativ e
objective to eventually terminate the nonconforming use.
B. M&S's INTERPRETAI ION OF TIIK ORDINANCE IS
UNWORKABLE AND NOT SUPPORTED BY HIE RULES OF
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.
I he threshold problem presented by M&S"s arguments here, before the trial
court and at the Board of Adjustment is their insistence on an infinite period of
amortization. An infinite amortization period is not an amortization at all. but rather a
permanent exemption from ihe owner occupancy requirements id'the ordinance as a
nonconforming use. This is not contemplated bv the Citv "s legislative decision, the
applicable Utah stabiles or any legal definition of the amortization procedure as applied to
nonconforming uses. \Lv;S"s interpretation of the amortization ordinance would make ii
a nullity as applied to its properties. An interpretation and application of the ordinance
v\ hich renders all or part i)i il Ineffective is contrary to the rules oi statutory construction.
It is important to keep in mind that the amortization pros isions at issue here were
part ol an ordinance enacted to eliminate non-owner occupied appurtenant property uses.
Permitting an infinite amortization would, on its face, undermine the ultimate public
policy goal and purpose of ihe ordinance.
By definition, amortization oi a nonconforming use contemplates the eventual
termination oi the nonconforming use at an identified point in time.
An amortization ordinance is one which allows a specified use a
period of permitted nonconformity but requires that it be terminated
at the end oi such period.
1 Young. Aiide^i.\n\s._:\]iK\r.Le.an__r___i\\ oi/onjng (4 ed. 1990) tj 0.71 at 007.
Amoriizalion secures the eventual but certain termination oi'
nonconforming uses and structures bv a provision in a zoning
ordinance which requires that, after the lapse of a specified time, all
or some specific nonconforming uses must be discontinued. Fhe
time peiiod may either run from the dale the use was established or.
as is often the case, from the date ihe ordi lance becomes effective.
The time period is intended lo give the nonconforming owner or
operatoi an opportunity lo amortize his investment in the
nonconforming use and. to fie extent that the structures used therein
cannot be used for a conforming purpose, the investment in the
structures.
4 zuegler, RathkopPs the I.aw of/oning and Planning (4 ed. 1000, supp. 2001) § 74.14 at
74o3 (emphasis added).
I he Cilv's authority to enact an amortization ordinance for nonconforming uses at
the lime came from the Utah Legislature.
Ihe legislative body mav provide tor:
(b) the termination oi all nonconforming uses. except billboards, by
providing a formula establishing a reasonable time period during
which the owner ca_n.R_a)ver or amortize the amount of his
investment in the nonconforming use, if a iv . . .
Utah Code Ann. s? 10-9-40S(b) (2001) (emphasis added)."'
Both Ihe statutory language and the common defmiiions of amoriizalion of a
nonconforming use embody two principles: (1) Ihe nonconforming use will come to an
end after a specific period. (2) the properly owner will have a leasmKibleoppojInnily to
recoup the investment in the property. 'Fins is consistent with § 14.3().09()(2)(a) oi the
CitCs ordinance recognizing the amortizalion period as one in which "an ow net" may-
recover the amount of his investment in property."' (emphasis added).
It is important to recognize thai amortization affords a property ow ner only the
OPPlLOuniiv to iccoup its investment. If, as is the case here, the properly owner chooses
not to charge mai ket rents or any rent at all for the nonconforming apartments, that is ils
choice to forego the opportunity to recoup its investment. That conscious choice by the
propelty owner cannot preclude Ihe City from imposing a reasonable amoriizalion pel iod
for the nonconforming use in which the opportunity exists for recoupment.
'Currently Utah Code Ann. .. IO-9a-5I l(2)(b).
Whether the 22-year 3-month amortization period is reasonable turns on statutory
construction and application (d' § 14.30.1100. The principles of statutory construction
apply equally to statutes and ordinances. /..iS'., Bennion v. Sundance Dev. Corp.. 897 P.2d
1232. 1235 (Utah .App. 1905). The primary goal in interpreting legislative acts is to give
effect to the legislative intent. /;".£.. Anderson Dev. (\\ v. Tobias, 2005 U F 3b. <: 10. 1Id
P.3d >23. 330. In determining legislative intent, the court evaluates the language "in light
of the purpose the [ordinance] was meant to achieve." Nixon v. Salt Pake (Ity Corp.. SOS
P.2d 2o5. 208 {Utah 1995). In the event the ordinance language is ambiguous, the courts
mav look to the Iegislativ e history and oilier policy considerations in construing the
language. Andeison 11 40 at o^(r. NeKon y,_SaH Lake County. 005 P.2d 872. N75 (Utah
1905).
Courts avoid construing a legislative enactment in a way which would make it
inoperable, /..g., Young Pleclric Sign Co. Inc. v. Dept. of Transp.. 2005 UT App lo9,
11 7. 110 P.3d 1118, 1120 (rejecting interpretation which would render statute
"meaningless. ') Similar!}. construction oi an ordinance should not be in contravention of
its cypress purpose. Perrine v. Kennecotl Mining Corp., 91 1 P.2d 1290. 1202 (Utah
1996n Nor do courts "construe a statute in such a wa_v as to rentier certain viable parts
meaningless and void." Nelson, at 87o.
MtfcS's proposed construction of the amortization ordinance runs afoul of these
well-settled principles. There is no question that the legislative intent oi the Cilv Council
was to bring an eventual end to accessory apartments in single family residential /.ones
covered by the S Overlay provisions in dwellings which were not owner occupied. This
means the ev entuai end oi any nonconforming use falling within this category. There is
also no question that the legislative intent included providing owners the opportunity- to
recoup their inv estments by way oi a reasonable amortization period wInch would apply-
to the cireumsianees of each particular property. M&SVs construction of the Citv's
ordinance would allow it. al ils sole discretion, to avoid collecting rents or any significant
rents and thereby create a perpetual nonconforming use in violation of die clear
legislative intent oi Ihe (1'ty ('ouncil, therefore rendering the amortization provisions
meaningless.
Admittedly, the ordinance does not specifically define "net income" for purposes
ol' calculating the applicable amortization neriod. It is apparent that the Cilv and MrxS
interpret "net income" differently, leading to an ambiguity in the ordinance. I his
ambiguity requires the Court to give meaning and effect to ihe public police goals and
objectives underlying the amortization ordinance in order to yield both a reasonable
period lor potentially recouping investment while eventually bringing an end to the
nonconforming use. This is what the Community Development Department did in ils
initial evaluation oi the amortization period and what the Board ()i Adjustment relietl
upon in aflirming that decision. Phis is also the analysis which guided the trial court's
decision, it is appropriate tor this Court to uphold those determinations.
( . TIIKRK IS SUBSTANTIAL UVIDKNCE IN THK RKCOUI) TO
SUPPORT THK 22-YIAR 3-MONTH AMORTIZATION DLCISION.
This ( ourt set larth the appropriate standards lor review of a board of adjustment
decision in Save Our Canyons v. Bd. oi A(ljuslmen_t_oi Sa.lt Pake (luuity, 2005 UT App
2S5. 1 10 P.3d 078.
\\ e will consider the Board's decision arbitral v or capricious only if
il is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. In
determining whether substantial evidence supports the Board's
decision we will consider all ihe ev idence in llie record, both
favorable and contrary and determine whether a reasonable mind
could reach the same conclusion as Ihe Beard. It is not our
preiogative lo weigh the evidence anew. I lowever, whether or not
the Board's decision violates a. statute, ordinance, or existing law, is
reviewed for correctness, bm we also afford some level of non-
binding deference lo the interpretation advanced by the Board,
Save Our_Canyons1l 12 at 082-83 (citations, punctuation omitted). Fhe Supreme Court
has. consistent with Ihe reviewing statutes, instructed that courts are lo presume the Board
oi" .Adjustment decision to be valid. Carrier, supra *l 25 at 1214.
IS
"Fhe central question here is whether. as required under Utah Code Ann.
^ ]i)-o_408(2).* the 22-year 3-month amortization period is a reasonable period in wInch
MeeS may recover its investment, should it choose to do so. Fhe infinite amortization
period insisted on bv MocS is not "reasonable" in the sense of eventual!} bringing an end
to the nonconforming use. the intent oi the City" s legislative action. It is important to
keep in mind that though MrXiS or the ('ourt might reach different conclusions based upon
the figures which form the underlying facts of this matter, those conclusions are
immaterial to the issue of whether the Citv's anal} sis and conclusion are reasonable and
supported bv substantial evidence.
I he tacts behind MceS's argument for infinite amortization were compiled and
presented in its application for amortization determination. (R. 507-537.) The Citv
compiled and analyzed this information in determining the amortization period. (R. 503-
507.) The City has never disputed the base figures wilh respect to acquisition and capital
costs or rents actually received by MiS.
1here is a discrepancy in the figures representing purchase price and other capital
costs as adjusted for inflation. 1his discrepancy appears to result from NhviS's
application of a full year's worth of depreciation in 2000 while ^ 14.30.001! expressb
prov ides for depreciation adjustment onlv through April 4. 2000. Fhe Cilv \ figures
reflect this shorter period for depreciation adjustment.
'I he serious point oi contention between the parties is what net income figure :o
applv to the amortization formula. Here also there is a discrepancy. MeeS would use net
income after depreciation, while the City used net income prior to depreciation. 'Fhe
dilterer.ee is significant because allowing both depreciation and amortization allows two
measures ot recoupment to be applied simultaneously to the same investment.
1o "amortize" is to liquidate or extinguish, especially by periodic
payment to a creditor or sinking fund. It is submitted tliat the
Now $ 10-0a-51 l(2)(b).
concept permitting a nonconforming user to recover the value i)i his
property right over a period of time is more analogous to
depreciation for lax purposes, depreciation being a decrease in value
due to wear and tear. Actually, amortization within a specified
period merely means that a nonconforming user has that period in
which to phase out his operation in a manner which will involve the
least loss.
4 /legler. § 74.14 n. 5 at 74-55. "Fhe reality is that ihe amount of depreciation claimed in
any given lax year is a means of recoupment of investment m the properly. To avoid a
double recover} lo McCS. il is reasonable to use income before depreciation to calculate
the amortization period which similarly provides for recoupment of investment."4
Fhe second disagreement between ihe parties is whether the net income figures
during years prior to final completion of improvements which are intended to be
amortized, when the residence was under-occupied and undergoing major construction,
should be used in the amortization analysis. M&S insists that the income, actually losses.
from those periods is required as part of the analysis, pr manly because it supports their
claim to infinite amortization. The purpose of average past renlid incomes, however, is lo
give an indication of the actual rental value of the property for prospective application
toward recover} oi investment. The Community Development Department concluded
that under the circumstances here, "the rental income from periods prior to 1009 would
not be an accurate re fleet ion of expected future rental." (R. 505.)
M&S argues that the Council did not expressly intend to rely on future rental
values, but limited the consideration to actual historic income and losses. This is not
evident from ihe language oi the ordinance. Moreov er, this construction would _v icld a
result in this case which the Council clearly intended lo eliminate, a permanent
nonconforming use. Ihe Cii\ 's use of actual rental income for the fully completed
'M&S argues that the City used two inconsistent values for net income in the
calculations in R. 503-507. In reality, however, the City merely recognized M&S's
values reflecting the $27,000 net loss for ihe five-year period and used its own analysis to
arrive at the net income figure applicable to the amortization anal>sis. Fhe City is using
only one net income figure.
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dwelling is a reasonable interpretation oi the ordinance. To this end. the rental income
lrom 1090 and 2000 are a reasonable basis for determining average monthly net income.
In its annKsis, the Command} Development Department used McxiS's staled 1900
income, before depreciation. SI4.400. It used the 2000 figure for the first six months,
before depreciation, of $2,010 and adinsted that 2000 figure bv adding in 5.740.03 ed'
legal expenses which MeeS had deducted which were not actual operating expenses for
lie apartments, reaching a 0-momh total eA' SS.OoN.05. It then doubled that amount to
reach a 2000 figure of $ 17,530.06. "Fhe 1000 figure and the 2000 figure were added
together and dived by 24 months to get the average monthly net income figure of
$1,522.50. (R. 500.)
It is worth noting thai the appraisal provided by M&S indicated that the fair market
rental value of the units was more than tw ice this figure. $2,050. (R. 52S.) Had the City
used the fair market value established bv MeeS's appraiser, which could also be
reasonable, the amortization time would have been just under 10 years. By comparison.
the 22-year 3-month period is extremely generous and certainly reasonable.
Ihe Board was concerned oxer the effect of permitting a property owner to avoid
the amortization oi the nonconforming use by charging less than market value for its
rentals.
Mr. MacKay: I assume that what that they are holding here is that
they come up with a lesser value for rental to the property because
thev had people in there that thev were not charging, thefr relatives
and so forth like that. Does that'really play? Can tliey lake that oif.
because to me if vou are figuring the rental of the property vou are
figuring what il could be. Tf I let somebody go in there ivee. then
that's my responsibility and not a part of it.
Mr. Dixon: Ihat was Cary's |thc Community Development
Director] position in saving that xou could use the appraised market
value of die rent, is because a person could essentially violate ihe
ordinance indefinitely by simply not charging to rent'to family. And
then }ou've got all these singles in this neighborhood. And that was
not the intent oi the citv council.
And_l_think the way that we have approached ibis gives them a very
significant period of time. Tvventv-two years is a long time. 1 hey'
may not actually recoup it in 22 \ears because of whal vou're
2L
(R. 471.)
indicating, thev are charging if the}' conli mc lo charge significantly
below market rent. But^2 years is not based on market rent so it's
based basically on ihe rental thev receiv ed over the lasl OS months
prior to their submittal.
Board members also expressed concern about giving meaning and el led to the
ordinance by providing a reasonable time for amortization, recognizing that infinity is noi
reasonable in light id' die purposes of the ordinance. (I lustra tively, see R. 450.)
MttS's arguments to the Board focused on three core issues: (1)1 he ordinance
does not define "net income." (2) The ordinance does not expressly grant the
Development IJirector ihe discretion lo m; ke ad hoc determinations of net income for
application oi the amortization formula. (5) 'Fhough the ordinance grants the ('ommunity
Development Director the discretion lo adopt reasonable regulations to carry out the
purposes of the amortization provisions, he did not formally do so.
With respect to (1) and (2), it is important to recognize that the language of the
ordinance does not support M&S's conclusion that only actual historical rents of the
properly can be "average monthly net income." \et income is equally as undefined for
XUV'S as il is \\)r the City.
The issue then is which formulation produces a reasonable lime for amortization
w bile giving meaning and effect to the legislative intent to eventually terminate the
nonconforming use. 'Fhe Development Director's use of the 18-month rentals after
completion of the property improvements, extending those figures to 24 months, more
reasonably reflects the actual income which MtXoS received, or would receive, based upon
those imp_____vej._k.nls, and is a reasonable means of reaching the rental income figure. 'Fhe
use i)i rental figures from periods preceding the expenditures for capital improvements
bases ihe rents on a completely different valuation, that of the original, unimproved
structure, likewise, the use oi rental figures from the construction period does not reflect
the potential rental value based upon the completed improvements. 'Fhe purpose (4' the
amortization ordinance is lo permit recoupment oi the capital expenditures, implicitly
based upon the value of those expenditures, as reflected in reals received after the
completion of the improvements. I'se of the 1000 and 2000 post-construction rental
income is not an ad hoc determination oi rental income, but simplv a reasonable
determination ol rental income used to icach a reasonable amortization period.
It is true that the Community Development Director had not promulgated
regulations applicable to the amortization analysis. This lack of regulations, however.
does not make the Director's decision with respect to net income unreasonable. What the
ordinance provision reflects, as vvas recognized by the Board oi,Adjustment, is the
legislative dctci initiation that implementation of the amortization process be (1)
reasonable, and (2) "cam" out ihe purpose of this section." cj 14.050.000(4 i. V
discussed heiein, the determination of net income was reasonable and the resultant
amortization period vvas reasonable. Most importantly, the legislative purpose of the
ordinance was accomplished. M&S vvas afforded a reasonable lime for recoupment of ils
investment, should it choose lo do so. while ultimately putting an end to the
nonconforming use. 'Fhe legislative intent oi the (Ity was accomplished in a reasonable
manner.
Fhere is substantial evidence in the record to support the decision of the
Community Development Director. "Fhe Board of Adjustment properly atlirmed that
decision. Fhe decision is therefore not arbitrary or capricious. Fhere is no evidence of
an} villation id'statute, ordinance or common law in the Citv "s actions. 1lenee. thev are
not illegal as a matter of law. Based upon the record before the Board of Adjustment and
the satisfaction of the applicable legal standards, it is appropriate for this Court to affirm
the decision of the Board of Adjustment as affirmed bv the trial court.
III. THK TRIAL COLUT 1'ROI'ERLY KM ERKI) JLDCMKM AM)
DISMISSED ALL OK M&S'S REMAINING CLAIMS.
Mi\;S asserts in its argument in support oi its other as-applied challent: es:
At the hearing on January 27. 2000. the first statement to the ( ourt
b} Plaintiffs" counsel was to identity the two main issues remaining
in the lawsuit, i.e.. •"as-applied" and "amortization." and to adv ise the
Court that only the amortization issues, and not Ihe as-applied issues,
were before the Court.
(Aplt's Brf. p. 20.) Fhere are several problems wilh this statement. NKViS fails to point to
anything in the record to support that claimed statement. It is also unsupported by the
transcript of the hearing on January 27. Nowhere in that transcript does am thing come
close to the statement allegedly made.' It is obvious that neither the trial court nor
counsel for the Clly understood that M&S was claiming thai any additional as-applied
challenges continued to exist. M&S's argument that "Provo Cilv raised no objection to
Plaintiffs' stalcmenl of the issues." (Apll's Brf. p. 20), would support the conclusion that
the (lly did not hear such an explicit statement oi reservation oi other as-applied
challenges.
Moreover. M&S"s position is belied by other facts surrounding the cross motions.
In its summary judgment motion, the Citv soughi judgment "on all of the claims asserletl
in this consolidated action." (R. 443.) Similarly, in ils memorandum, the Citv recognized
the amortization issue as the only one remaining.
Because the Anderson decision dealt with McViS's facial challenges
to ihe text amendment in both actions, all that remains in this
consolidated action is the as-applied challenge which has been
distilled into the issue of whether the Citv's amortization
determination vvas arbitrary, capricious or illegal.
(R. 300.) During oral argument, counsel for the City twite pointed out that the sole issue
for resolving the matter was the review of Ihe amorlizal on decision.
[F |rom our vantage point we're here on a verx narrow basis wilh
respect to the as applied challenge to the ordinance to the specific
tacts and circumstances presented by ihe M&S Investment
property ...
(R. 1214. T. 14.)
Aiulthe parties are in agreement, as the court noted at the outset, that
this is a case that can and should be resolved on the basis of the
record of proceedings before the board of adjustment.
Admittcdlv, the transcript is somewhat incomplete. Doling "beginniim not
recorded." (R. 1214, T. 3.)
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(R. 1214. I". 15.) In his oral argument, counsel for M.VS did not object to either oi these
statements. Nor did M&S attempt to affirm their claim to anv other as-applied
challenges.
It is also interesting to look at the pleadings filed bv MitS. \UvS\ cross motion
was a motion tor summary judgment, not a motion for partial summarv judgment. (R.
0573.1 All of their memoranda and related filings state "summan" judgment." Not one is
captioned "partial summary judgment." Nor do thev use the phrase partial summary
judgment in an}' oi their arguments. Fhere was simply nothing to give notice to the Court
or the CIty that MiVeS disagreed that all of the other issues were subsumed into a review oi
the Cit} s amortization decision to determine if it was arbitrary, capricious or illegal, and
therefore could and should appropriately be decided on cross motions.
I lav ing lost on its amoriizalion challenge. MecS was forced to rev ive its other as-
applied claims to keep the litigation ad ive. Il did so by objection :o the order drafted bv
the City. In response, ihe Citv confirmed that it understood that the parties hv.ended to
resolve the ease on cross motions. Fvcn so. the Cit}' tliscusscti the legal merils of M&S's
as-applied claims as identified in their objection. (R. I 155-1 101.)
1he trial court overruled MecN\ objections, noting that it believ ed that the sole
issue was the amortization issue and that MccS did nothing to put "lie court on notice
otherwise.
'Fhe City had moved for summary judgment on all claims asserletl in
the consolidated action. .After rev ievvang both Plaintiffs and
I)e!cndant's Motions tor Summary Judgment, their responses, and
having heard oral arguments by both parlies, this Court was
persuaded bv Deiendunt that the sole issue to decide was wheiher the
amortization provisions oi the ordinance applied to the .\UVS
property were vadd ... As noted above, MeeS had responded to ihe
City's Motion for summary judgment and has had ample opportunity
lo argue all of their claims in both ils memoranda and at oral
arguments before this ('ourt on January 2, 2000 [sic].
(R. 1200.)
Ihe issue here is not really w'nether the trial court erred in its ruling. Fhe issue is
whether XhvS carried ils burden to preserve and prosecute ils claims. There is nothing in
the recorti to explain why the City believed die parties had agreed to resolv e ihe litigation
on cross motions. Il is clear that it bad that belief and slaet it in open court where M&S
was represented by counsel. (R. 1214. T. 15.) Apparent Iv. Ihe Coma also had thai same
understanding. (Id.) U&S allowed the City and the Court to believe there vvas only one
issue necessary to resolve the entire mallei'. It did nothing to make it clear that i! was
reserving additional c aims in Ihe event it did not prevail an ils cross motion. I his Court
should decline to reward a parly in this fashion.
Ihe trial court was in the best position to evaluate the facts related to Mt\:S"s
objection. As such, it is allordcd consitleiable discretion in applying the law to those
facts. "Fhe court did not abuse that discretion ami ils ruling liould be affirmed.
IV. THK TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO CLEAR ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ORANTINC THE MOTION TO INTERVENE.
it is important lo note thai MlvlS's challenge to ihe intervention of neighboring
properly ow ners can result in no meaningful remetiv from this Court. Fhe imervenors tlitl
not participate in the briefing or argament of the issues before the trial court. Fhere has
also been absolutely no legal prejudice lo M&S by then intervention. It is unclear what
M&S wishes to accomplish by challenging Ihe interven ion.
Mt\:S misundc;stands severa elements oi its arg.nnents. First, it alleges dial the
iuicrvenors lack standing to intervene. Fhe Utah Suprc ne ( ourt. however, has stated that
intervention "is the act by which a third part}' obtains sl intjjng to become a party in a
suit."' iLircJOI l._, 2000 liT 30, MS I, I37 P.3d 800, S20 {emphasis added). 'Fhe closest
thing to a standing issue is the showing which an intcrvenoi must make.
Fo jListi .'y intervention, the party seeking mtei vention must
demonstrate a direct interest in the subjec natter ol the litigation
such that the intcrvenor's rights mav be affected, for good or for ill.
[he requisite interest necessaiy to permit intervention may aiise
from the intcrvenor's status ofiher circumstances.
J" re_H.j_L "I 3 I at X20. Utah appellate courts have neve- iddressed the issue of whether
neighboring piopcrly owners have sufficient property interest to intervene in this type oi
litigation. Courts which have addressed Ihat question h ive generally permitted
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intervention, /at;., I.arock v. Sugarloaf Township /mmig^jearingJAL- 740 A.2d 30S.
313 (Pa.Cmvv Ith. 1090) ("owners of property in lhe immediate vicinity of property
involved in zoning litigation have the requisite interest and status to become
intervenors'O: Freesen. Inc. v. Count} of McLean. 030 NT.2d 411.413 (III.App. 1003)
(permitting Iantlow ner intervention): Mobil Oil Corp. v. Zoning Htl. oi .Appeals of ('hy of
Bridgeport. 644 A.2d 401. 404 (Conn.App. 1004) (""because of this cognizable interest,
the intervening defendants have standing in this controversy"].
Fhe reliance M&S places on Perper v. Pima ('ounly, 000 I\2d 32 (Ariz. App.
1070) is misplaced. In Perper. a settlement had been reached and judgment had been
entered on that settlement. The iVrper holding is consistent with the general rules of
intervention. OstleLY^Buhler. 1999UF99." 0 m 3. 0X9 P.2d 1073. 1077 ('-[ he general
rule is that intervention is not to be permitted after entry of judgment."): Millard County
^MuSiate_Fa\ Comm'n. 833 P.2d 439. 4b 1 (Utah 1991) ("1 he general rule under the
rules of civil procedure is that final settlemeni of all issues by parlies to a controversy
renders a permissive intcrvenor's motion to intervene moot.") Neither condition was
present here. As tliscusscti abov e. there was no settlement agreement. Nor had judgment
been entered at the time of intervention. Fhe Perpcr ease prov ides no support for MecS's
position in this case.
Fhe purpose of intervention is to eliminate unnecessary duplication of litigation.
Cen__mrjan_CoiP_J v. Cripps, 37" p.2d 033. 937 (t 'tab 1978). " Ihe policy in the law is. and
-diould be. to simplify and expedite procedure and to avoid a multiplicity of lawsuits."
Bartholomew v. Bartholomew. 34S P.2d 23S. 241 (Utah 1970) (finding joinder
jusu'liable). 1 here is no question that the neighboring owners wonhi have commenced
separate litigation had thev no\ been permitted to intervene in this matter. "Fhe real
considerations in ev alunling a motion to interscue are "whether the party's intervention
would unduly delay a pending action or if permitting him to intervene would undulv
complicate issues." Interstate Land Corp. v. Patterson, 707 I\2d 1101, 110S (Utah App.
1090). Neither situation was present here.
1he argument that the intervenors' motion was untimely similarly lacks merit. An
individual mav onlv intervene once he knows that his interest in litigation may tliverge
from those ol the parties and that he may not be adequately represented by those parties.
See FYeescn, Inc., supra, ("when a government entity is involved, interested parlies
legitimately mav assume thai their elected officials will adequately represent their
interests as members of the general public. Only when the interests of the general public
tliverge from those of ihe individual is the private party obligated to lake action to protect
his interests.") I he triggering event for these intervenors was receipt 14'information that
the parties might be settling the litigation in a manner potentially adverse to their
interests. Onlv when they became aware of that did thev seek to intervene. 'Fheir motion
was not untimely.
M&S also makes extensive argument as It) why die intervenors had no right lo
intervene under Rule 24(a). It ignores the lad that Ihe rtervenors also sought leave lo
intervene under the permissive standards of Rule 24(b). Fhe scope of Rule 24(b) is fairly
broad, permitting a party to intervene "when an applicant's claim or defense and the main
action have a question of law or fact in common." Rule 24(b). I Hah R.Clv.P. Also broad
is the discretion afforded to the court. "A trial court's grant of interv eniion pursuant to
Rule 24(b) involves the discretion of the trial court and we will not overturn ils ruling
absent a clear abuse of discretion" Slate v. Sucec. 024 P.2d SS2, SS7 (Utah 199o). McV:S
has failed to show a clear abuse of discretion in this case.
COMILUSION
1 he amortization determination, as affirmed by the Board of Adjustment, was not
arbitrary, capricious or illegal. Rather, it afforded a reasonable period for M&S to recoup
ils investment, should il choose lo tlo so, while giving effect to the legislative intent lo
eventually terminate the nonconforming use.
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Fhe record indicates that M&S had at least acquiesced to having the cross-motions
tor summary judgment be dispositive of all issues in this matter. Having permitted both
the City and the trial court to believe that to be the case, it should be estopped from now
asserting its alleged as-applied challenges, especially in light of the legal weakness of
those challenges. 'Fhe trial court did not err in entering judgment as to all of the claims in
the consolidated matter.
The intervention issue has no substantive merit here. 'Fhere is no relief which this
Court can grant which would be meaningful. Moreover, M&S has failed to demonstrate
that granting intervention vvas a clear abuse of discretion as required by the applicable
standard.
The decisions of the Board of Appeals and the trial court were valid and correct as
a matter of law. Hie City therefore respectfully requests that this Court affirm those
decisions. •.2/si"
DA'FFD this ^ dav of January. 2007.
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Bv
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JODY K DUR.NITT
lav, omcis Of
1
A ;;RO-BSIONAl rcspQR.MfON
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November 26, 200:
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TrlfPHONE (301)521-5676
CONFIDENTIAL R.UCE 403 SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATION
Sent via Facsimile (363.0400) & U.S. Mail
Keith A. Call
Snow, Christcnstn & Mard_ncau
lOE^charuie Place, 13,h Floor
"P. O. Box 45000
Salt hake Citv. UT 84145
Re; Af £r:S Jnvtstmmts, LLC. n al v. Prow C
Civil No. 000403654
Our laic No. 1140.0012
.ciUi:
VVc have appreciated the c,pr>om:n:rv oi enaattine in a consumawe dialogue with
vou in nn aacmpt to explore the possibfirV of a negotiated resolution of this Case. Th.it
mciucc?. you:* coopenhon in submitting tn application for amortization mutuant to the
p;o\.vou> {>i Pmvu Giry Code § 14.30.090 ;'<_>i d:c piopeitv !ocaieu ;u 1310 NTidi
900 East.
In lurbierancc of that effou, 1 am ibiwai-auig on behalf of Piovo City an outline of
me conceptual framework ior a settlement agreement. It is impouant to bear in mmd lIui
.:: ihis point this is hrgelv my work product. As vou are undoubtedly aware, any binding
apwcnwnE mmt rJiinuucly he approved ihruu^h appropriate channels by Provo Cuv
However, m mv experience, the only rcaiutic wav x.o achieve tJiat goal is to trv and
mwonatc the terms of a mntuadv acceptable tentative agreement subject to formal
apuioval.
The type or agreement: I have m mind, if we are successful in concluding :iws<:
negotiations, would he m Uie ionn oi a relatively >imply stipulation, motion and order to
if
>un A. <i .a . 1 . November 26, 2002
be submitted to the Conn, h would .mm with a recitanon of die intent of the parties to
fully and completely resolve all eb:ms and disputes between them relating to dvh; Pupation,
Trut would include dismissal of fhe case with piejudke aim a general iclease of ail
historical claims. Akhoupji the parties may very well identify additional issues that need to
he resolved as part oi the agitcmcnt, at a minimum, the following issues1 should be
addics.weP
1- Lll(LiIOME
As pan ot anv such as Hens sent, TVnvo Ciry wonId recognize and apDrove the
u.uitiii.iitjg nonsom'onrdm' vise of the home located ai 1310 North 900 Ea.u
(il;e "j H10 IIoiju'"), granting tl:e owner oi' the property an indefinite
extension of tune exempting the propercy from complying with the -so-called
"owner occupancy" requirements adopted i.i Ordinar.ee 2000-15 in order to
allow the owner to recover (he amount of their investment in the property
uwdei provisions of 5 14.3Cl.090 oi the Provo <diiy Code. The owner would
be required to comply with ai! other applicable requiicmcnus of the Provo
C.jty Code, inducing the definitions and rules with respect to occupancy in
§ 1-1.30.030, which predated your client's requisition of the 1310 Home.
2. lilOJiOME
We undcistand that your slieu! also purcha:ed a home at 1410 North
900 hast in Provo City in "1999 (the "1410 Home"), which does not have
an accessory ap.mmcjit r;r:d dionfow dtxs .usi niugct dfC pfovpiij]^ uf Use
ovcihy zone temirdmg the definition and rules with respect to occnnaniv.
However, the 1410 Home would he required to comply with the provisions
and, ruirs with icspcct to ouaipanev that appjy to ..il Mnide-family dwellings
in Prewo City, including the definition of family which, again, predates your
client's -acquisition of the property in cuicsrion.
As I meuiioned previously while there m.iy verv well be other issues that need to
he addressed in die agreement, tins basically encompasses the conceptual framework we
nave ameed to in pimeiple and can therefore be n.sed as r w basis for the preparation of die
pleadings necessarv to implement the -averment which t;x then be submitted to the
Conn.
O-ic. i
v>
Keiih A (PI November 26. 2o02
Vfr ici.k iorwarvi :o hmnng Pom vou (nee von have h.\d a chance m review ;wd
,;in.iw, mew muss wj:h won: i'i;c;U--. 1 van lake t:'ie PbnnU^ oar in m'cpwmg a mmuai
nra;r of Pie settlement n.cadinm <wowpassiug the .mwemeut outimed ahove.
Thauk vou lor your .u.miwucd cooucumvn and as.maame in aurnmuna, m
LLCjcludc a wu'ement agreement rc-o.vvm teas dtmuw.
1KTP
v vi'.iirA
wippiams cv nxdoi'v
!)
'<\/-Lc <y,- -., pm-
JmfvK rviruefr
Carv A. McGinn una facsimile lx maiP
IPend C. Dixon
Neil ,\. 1unobcm
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CONFIDENTIAL RULE 408 SETTLEMENT COMMUNICATION
Keirh A. CCA
5:u:w, CPrhtemen &: Martinet?;:
10 Pxchange Place, 11* Pinnr
P O. Box 45000
SaJi PaKc Cm U 1 84145
VIA_FACSlMlLi-. AND U 5 MA1I
Re: PiOuS Inrcstutejtt^ LLC, ct r.l r. Provo City
Civil No. (K)O403n.S4
Our Hie No. 1140,0012
Dcu- Keiuu
I acknowledge n-ccipt of your ierter of April 24, 2003, and h.:ve aad .m
t py;eiiiiwy n i review ii vo.\h repscwmauvcv oi Provo <Pv.
1iu.s response is intended to h rji se; the record straight wnk re.-pcu to onr
pennon on Px snmis (ii ncrntMTPio ami wcl; daPfkntinn of voter carnPs nosmon ..up
mw.ndcu conrw o:i action
A- I ;:.;w. lepejLcdiy ,id"\ Pcd \uu. ooili oiplv .;nd in wutuw. uiidr we have
.;_. pucamd yun and your ehenrs wPimrmcsu to ci'ipactc in a conmusdvr diPorme intended
:o c\plwc a p^wihy seidrnient of tins ea>r. we lane no; leatued :i sctPemcnr. aarcemen; as
cPnns Pme. "1 he cursory analysis m your lend of April 24, 2003, eoircmirndy oiuw
•dcniu' to my letter oi No.eniPer 2o. 2002. a corw <;f which is encln-td lor vr w
nu.miaci-ce a;m ufemme, m whicn 1specifically advised you that "anv kmdm^ amcrmem
•nn-i uannLiu-iy he approved through appropriate, channels by Provo C::vP My letter
v.em on to swwes; a posnPP mnwwork :rr sertlerncrm
U -1
V-3-
y
Kmh A. Call Play 7,200:-!
In respou-.e. veil mrwornYd to us v,h-.n you e-udidly ;k kuow'ed^vd to be "a
ptopowd sciPeoten: apiccmcutP Cnhkc t ic case cittmons vi.^u provided in votu Purr ni"
Apnl 24, iUOr^ then: ;wc no wmten communieanoio between (oiutsel ayreeinm to the
material tcnnw ol seuieincm hi this ease. Outre to the contrary, rh.u continues to he ihe
spume iono oi our dno mow Moreover, the moie complicated decision wahiup prepress
ana n.imtory rutin,r;ry to hind local government supines a u.'ioplenPy different maivsP
than m the. ( ase of piiv.ue panics.
IJawnp '.a;d that, 1'iovo U:i\ certamlv "uands hv'' w- tomnimnenr to try to rwch a
senienum m this, case, which was the specdic intent oi my leiur <T April 2.2^ 200..P and
Pie irpnr^ for adPiuonai mtormanon. fhiwever. the mformahon i? srhutamwelv
nnpoit.-mt icr Pte (Pmv \ nac.v i;i icspnndiitp to yom wuPwcta piopovp and is no;
5imply wmdow ilres-an;' to "politically help die City.'*
WP '.yii.!,! trconi:;: vou to recon>;der vour pouiticn and resound by orowdtim the
information reo,uesi.ed. 1 am soil of die view thi.it with dm: Prnrht ohth-.u information, wc
can reach a mutually .iueptahk srndemenl of this dispute. As Pwayn. we are more than
wihma, to meet to r*»u>,s these tones and try to mose that tnocc-s pjivmrd.
Very only vours,
WILLIAMS eP JJUNT
\ \ I t r-J~
1KB
Hit !m:u
Uo.iv A. MeCum
David C. Dixon
OUV A\
I /
IP
Ruiucj r
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COIPM V. STATE OF IPFAH
MrP:S INVESTMENTS, L.L.CY a Utah
iumled LmLnliiy eom.[.!uny, MERVYN
COX AND SUSAN COX,
IPPnuLn;
PROVO CITY CORPORATION.
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
CYse No. O00M>36:w
judue Steven P. Ham-en
ri ho nnitter v. as won_Pu berbre the (.'- uri on PLinmPs and DelendiwPs .Mw.iwi :Pr
Sniinur, .h.:.!ntre:it Pie J en NuvenPei ?0, PPo ;.::.; Ocwber IP 2005. tcsncmwP :od ..wwd
beP're the CPiat tPr en Penary 2'f, 20<J6. The Conn, Pn m_i pan! end iwmwm, tat j P.\ P :
ic\ ;ev, e-a the icspcUivc incniuiunda ufthc panics, ncichy denies rkuntifPs Mution of .v, nan.-i; v
Piwnwnt :.nd grants Dcicndbnt's Motion of Summary judgment.
Stat en le n. t a f_ Fa e ts
'! he iw.nv, ::il: !;icns are not tn casptite.
'\h\i cu-e .raws uut of a 2000 Pnmo City ::o:nng ordinance, the S Overlay Una
"'0:P.:r.:rnP'). The Onlimnci rnwides that ;; home :w;st w: evwer ocenried if the h ••rt-.e ownr
i J.
PPreu to rem their accessory apaa intent. The elleet ot die PPdnuinee i.-> to mammon me
-PPmial atmosphere eiihe neighborhood while aocaminodatinp the need tot wi'cnr.pns
uwha', pit HYP su.Jeta::. hPe Otdinanee albmed a noir unnlert um.cf ef affected pn cip-oi ;>• to
wP' to the P; wo P'tty mnnnuamy Dc whop: tan.t Dhector n'ie TJbv, t a ior
nwe i'i whieh m hrire w: p: watty ink) roup;mice. "I re Piiwctm toes a nn.thenaVne.ii PninuoP.
awealed n: the Onhaatne to hnn an npjn«.-pt irle amomaa!;r.: pesiod lor the titPa ted no'petty.
PlthithP'purchased a home in L'Oc when [here was no owner ocennancy wwrneitieub
'i'liey mhtteqitcmily t-.pina mer S3U0,090.00 icinndellne, the home. AT,.n Ye Oidhiunse pwaea,
IMaintitTapplied to die City Per relief, Based on the inforniabon stihmiUcd hy PiahttilP the Cily
granted a twemy-two year, three month period for Plamtifflo recoup ha no cement.
Phiml.it now ;,£cks staninatv judi'merA on the baats that Ihe CityP application vt pjovo
CP> Oidiram.ei; 20'0-15 v,ea; hicmisPumt and therefore a:biliary, iheaai or :apnewaa. Phnriiif
a; aue.-, Unitaa nuPmme m;aod of amomaatPm ts pen- Ada turner tin* <P\: nance ;i"d tint the.)
•Lena: he r; awed an ntdeltnite inncd of anwi ti/niien. Defend tint :-, wka :nnui:;,.:y itic!.:.; neat w:
the ha;P that the pwpose and intent of the Ordinance is camped von: ihe City's decision :o pram
a 22 )ear. 3 montli amoriinanori period tnid that an indefinite- pericu m ninvnP.aPn wwild "n;
ineotn-istent wish the rales of statutory eorislrucbom
Anah sis
As the parties have stipulated tn this matter, summary judgment is proper and Pntil he
rwiPwd a.iniv, nil became inert: are no penuir.e isv.ics of material fact and the ntnvinn rmiy is
einnod ;ojt.;!a;:o:it :-o a maiter of law. Utah P. Civ. i\ mvALnpym.v v. a-Vm Z.:;m- ms,;:v, >rP
in Pi 2*1, n^mi.a.P Iv^y") Summary jmPmn-m is a harsh rmm.ne and oppeoiim nan;n
mammons are :o lie considered in a ILht most Pmemble to him. iPm/P,' o /YPrunmP 737 PPd
h.v il'tan Cr. App. vo7).
it is apnronmne to £he "some level of ncmb;mim=; deierence" to a local hnanl of
adlot mend,-, imeipictaPou ofan ordinance. Carrier ;: Suit .PaPc Cvuniv. 20C4 I.JT '-•'•'•. 'This
bivrmedinte. approach provides a propm balance by affording respect to the local smrmPs
nahaed knc.'. leJaae while, cnsunnp that the inietpretatinn of ordinances am: statutes rem:-.us
hv vni.inn me province of the counts." Id. Tins standard .shall be apphed here.
i in: ome ;n t.ns earm :s v. nether the Beard mPXchnmnmis correctly imcmtoied ..mi
:ed the Ormnam'e wPen a.slrm lite lontnfn lo en! enhoe. 21a:nmPs ariord/ahrn m'nod.
::mi a.L,ue^ :hat the City's uppiieutnm of J;e u!.wima;.oi; limmila in the mUm^^e -'.as
.;.d. A nnain„ oiPlieaahty Eeoaires dia*. '.IPs couadetermine that the City's "deci:oo:i,
nattce. cr mnulatiem violates a law. stamte; or ordntame in edect at the time the aecmm: v as
me
1 J
mrdeomhe ordinance or reptdation adopted.'" Utah Code Ann. $ 10-9a-y0!(3pd) (7005). Phis
Coe.it IPids tto att^h viohition.
Phumiif aiso claims that die City's appUeacoit oidhe amortization fonmihi m the
ev.oPnceP" Apply, ap this .mnniurd oftevPw, me n ote re norms v hot run s'Panattna! oPo
his Co, ;'i firm-; Ihrt 'he (Pit a d. e- 'daxc a vp -nariial :1m : d in.-,:-, h
ui-^iei};aic;es i;i the tmaics. 'Ihe Beaid of Adjustment rcvOoi pondJe^ .mbPtmbal mhdmcc in
support of the City's amord/alien deeiatoa. The City cor.ideted the ePdence p:o\;ded by MorS
rentnxiing a reasonable nmoimomon period. The <!eeision, therefom.. wax not arbimnv or
capricious, i he purpomot tm :i:;:om.omon ordinance P to temumm r.ouumfmimnp ive
?la.nmVa:pued "a; at the j: brasa "time period1 'in the ordinance is brond enonah lo extend lo
n tmny. i im C< m n;uvr-: with Pie ( :tvP irlenpnmmou thm "tiire period" is a dehnite pePmi ot
mi..;*, not nnte;Pi:te. 1ias is inherent in ihe purpose of the Oatule,
One of tita me foods that pam eminent can m.e to terminate a mmcmuo runny are ii
a !-..! .il!. i lei .nan: iIMl.h.,, [,\: a.o v;i jaacm a.!,.:!it - a a;, a a pita 'i,l nu i1 c ..I'-o1 a::. i
cm to ccme into cmifomv-.nee with ihe new retmlalions. An aim: tvatk'ii ttaPP which Pas not
nitiirateiy lernvnate the noncontbnnum use fails to fulfill :ts essential nuroom and nmle-nnnies
! i
the purpose and effect of local zoniim, ordinanaes. Therefore, decisions regarding the status of a
armceufemnr p use Pa and he viewed narrowly with mest doubt resolved in no.or of the eventual
Pbrunrboi: ofthe nonconforming use. See tiwnphrey v. Rc.bens:>;i, 709 So.3d 333, 377 (Pa. Cu
App. loOSr
IP determine reasonableness, courts generally balance the public pain npautst the
tmmmmi P ss. Pee LOH-lV, LLC. o Cay m'TP/ayn; m;;A n P-3d 70S pN.NPApp. 2Pm>PPm
i#. 'ctnl me tmates tf.e >mmlantial auionnt of renters that phcatiff Oa-^ made to t'teir ps. orm..
app;'e\anateh- SaomOUO.OO, and that Com: ynprovamen*-; w rre made so ih.n :he pdCiinlitP o-,n.h.J
rent om beta portion-* ofthe house. However, f'h.iuliff pincino.cd the house ia Woo" ,.:td the .a-e
had been in existence less than lour years before the ordinance had pas.scd. The public's ottercs:
m uiainianunm: mPdmmd uimosphere mum til so he ncupi.eci. dhe bcneiu m .hv panne :_,••.
lecuh im*, eventual ierinination ofthe noneonibrmiim ase can only bo met with a reaMnu.hlj
atnoni/alicn period, Ihe City's approach to ealea'ating the unionization period tor PlaimnPs
property and their determination ofrh: nvcntyd'Ao yeats, three months unionisation petted .s
masotmb'o becam.e it allows a snfPctent period for Plaintiffs '0 recoup its invesmmm tn the
ptcpatty '.Pnle satisfying the purpose ofthe Omnom m of eventually etrdnm all noncomonniup
CONCi •1.1.S.[ON
As a matter ot una1, the Cinan rovrads sun ;nmay juomiem to Dofendam i'mvo Citv
Corporation and amnios, aa: Boani ol Aejualtnem decision apply upr ihe x\\ em> mvo near, three
month aniottinahoa pe:iod to the MioS propeay. 'I he Count runitem; dial deh rdant piep.ae tP
aoptouraite order eoiisioenl v. itii this decision wbhin twenty (20) o.ro--.
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Fourth Judicial Distnci Court
of Utah County. Staift of Utah
^ "Ll" ' U•plW Deputy
IN THE I-OURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY
STAPH OF UTAH
MNS INVESTMENTS, L.L.C., a U:\;h hniina!
hPearv eo:r,panv. MERVYN COX ANT)
SI NAN COX.
PPiir.dtP
ITCAO CPI Y ( ORPOICYHON.
1 Rtrndaru.
SUMMARY JUDCPMIPNT AND
ORDER OP DISMISSAL
CoroolaPued
Civil No 00O408o54
Jndee 8raven, I . Har.san
1"1 Li - matter came before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable .Steven I . Hansen
mvnduipr :<r- con-adcrarion n; eross•'-nounmis tor oirnmary pidpment ' at all en flic claims
as-erect in thn consolidated action. A hrarinp on the motions was held before die Court
on Pmmmy 2"A 2006. The pl.mitPP, were reprcsemed by Reed L. VPatnineau and Rvan IP
Bell. Defendant, was repunemed Pv Jodv Iv Rumen and David C. PPvm.
1-oilouim', the oonchiMon ot the hcannp, die ( ot.n tool; the matter under
advisement, and having reviewed the legal memoranda and exhibits submitted by the
parties and havnm, coiindcrcd the arpumenta oi ccriinsch issued its Memorandum Decision
dated January 80, 2006, prantinp defendant lYovo (lityp Motion for Summary Judpmenr
anil denynm, phintiPPs Motion for Summarv Judgment. Poignant to that Mcmoiandum
Decision, ir is hetcPv ORDERED, ADJDDCED AND DECREED as follows:
1. Dciendanr Provo OityP Motion tor Sunnnrmy Judgment is hereby pmntcd
on the basis that there arc no pcnunie issues ot material tact and the Roard of Adjustment's
decision was not arbitrary, capricious or ihcgal and was supported by substantial cvielence
in the record as mom lullv set forth in the Memorandum Decision ot January 80, 2006.
2. Plaintiffs McPS Investments, P.E.C., Mervyti Cm and Sue CoxN Motion for
Summary Jikhtmcnr is hereby domed for the reasons inoie tuilv ser lort'n m the
Memorandum Decision of January 30, 2006.
8. Rased on that fnrcgoinp, ordcis and tor tint reasons mote Pilly set ioith
above, the plaintilPf Oomplahm together with all chums and theories asserred therein in
this consolidaicd action, is hereby dismissed, with prejudice and upon the merits. All
panics ,n~e io hear ;he;r own respective costs and anomen's tecs.
- r?
DATED this ->r-d.\\v o W«- . 2006.
IVY El IE COURT:
Steven L. Hansen
Distru t Court Judge
FILED
Fourth Jmnhcial D'strict Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
/Deputy
IN THK FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY. STATU OF UTAH
MePS INYESd MENTS, P.P.C.. n Utah
limited Liability company, Y1PRYYN
COX ANT) SUSAN COX.
hum
PROVO CITY CORPORATION.
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 000403654
JucEne Steven P. Hansen
"I h;s matter was broupht he:Pre the Court on Plaintiffs' Objection to us Propo.-cd
Sunn:.are Judgement ami Order of I)isinis<ah filch on IT'brnary 16. 2000. ihe Conn. hai\ine
reviewed the respective nienieiranda oi tlie jmrties. iierebv overrules PlaintnPs ORecmai to its
Pr^po^ed St.nnnary JuJgaieiil,
Analysis
PhihmfC ("MlvS") filed an ohiection to tiro City's proposed summarv iudemiem and order
uf dnauosal on the mounds that their Tac::il a:ui as-applied ehallenaes to the Piovo 0'itv nonnm
cr2n sat ne fn.n-i their ornunal conirl nr.t .-till oarvive a ml have not been ndwdun.ted. \PvSP
facial and as-applied challenpes have already been adjudicated by this Cooit when this Court
granted suntmagv uidgineiit in tav or ot the City. 1 here is itminihi leit lor tin s Court to decide in
this matter.
first, the Defendants facial challenge has been resolved in Anderspn_w._Proy_(i City_C_mp--
2005 ll'IAP PC PAdAC. In Anheiaon. the Utah Supreme (. ourt resohed all facia! ehalleraae.-, to
the S Overlay text amendments, when they hehl that the City acled within its legislative authority
m enaeung the amendments and that the amendments were reasonably related to legitimate
legislative objectives. Id,, "'*' 16 and 27. Because die amendments were found to be facially
valid, the S Overlay text amendments are not subject to anv additional facial challenges.
Second, there is no basis for MeeSA "as applied" challenges. NPCS argues that their "us
applied" challenges "'have never been litigated, have never been briefed lor Ihe Court, have never
been argued to ihe Couil. and time never been addres.sed or decided." (Plau.lifPs Objection tit a),
aPCS alleges that they have unresolved claims from Case No. Nn-102050. This action, however.
wars consolidated m August 2005 when counsel for MAiN prepared a Joint Motion for Order
Consolidating Cases and obtained signatures fioin opposing counsel. The Court consolidated
M&SN cases based in part on PLCShs icpiescnlation that their motion was made "for the reason
that both eases involve common ingestions n! pw .aid fact." (Point Motion mi Order
Consolidathm Oaset).
I tie ( 2ty had mo\ed for M:i:i!u:ry judement on ah claims asserted in 'die consoiidated
action. After reviewing, both PlaintifPs and iCfendanPs Motions lor Summaiy Jtuhuncnt, their
rcs;aenes, and h.cnng heard oral :unun:ents n'. Inch pames, litis I 'ourt was persuaded bv
Defendant that the sole issue to decide v. as whether Pie amortization provisions of tlie ordinance
js applied, to the M&S property weic \ahd. Procedural duo process Pas been met in this ease.
A< rated ancne. M&S had responded to tlie ( :tvP Motion for summarv ;udan:e:n ami Puis had
ample opporttiinty to argue all ot their claims m hoth its memoranda and tit oral arguments before
this Court on Janutiry 2, 2006. Tliu Court 11:0 summarily dismissed other claims raped \w MmS.
Oilier "as-applied" challenges to dispute the t 'ily's right to summary judgment alluded to in
Mr\m's ( fried urn arc now moot,
conclusion
As a matter of law, 'die Couit now eiiter.s the order which tlie City has drafted. MAST
obiennini is o\ erruled.
ft
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IX THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IX AXD FOR UTAH COUXTY, STATE OF UTAH
C : m
OW- :P
Pimm IWi-;ST\li-NTS, L.L.C.. a Utah
Pmiimi Liability company. \1ERYYN
COX AND SUSAN COX,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. UPOdOPcvt
Jucitrc- Stc\mi L. Hmrnmt
PROVO CITY CORPORATION.
Defendant.
Ph.-, tuntmr v.us biuaught before ihe Com": en PlamtPPP Objemiou lo i;s Proposed
ry Jticnement and Order of Dicniisaal, Plod on Pebnunrc 16, 20On. The Com p iutvutm1 "aI
no nm.i the rcmmPve memmmmhi olPhe muPcn. hmcmr overrules P hum LPs Ohm-: dm: :o
Proposed Smrmmrv mtdnment.
AnahMs
Phumilfs OPMeCSO Pled an ub lection A> the CPyN nronosed smmmuy umuiucm ..ad end;
mPho:no-u! -j\\ the mmums thai thotr tamal and .is-anpiied ciialletmcs lo the Pio\i o v nv Piatmio,
rdtmmee :mm Pm;r orPdmd complaint still sum ive and have not been adjudicated. \PvS A
iPcml and as-applied challenges have already been adjudicated by dnA Court when thta Court
pmnmd summary mdmttcnt hi favor orphe City, 'i'hem is mmmm let; for Ibis Com; to itec.de m
ibis mtiPcn
Pifst. the hVnmmnm hmial challenge Pus been msoP od in AmPmmn mhPnva C:ty Cmp.,
2PP)5 UT o, 1(B P.3d "d)\. In Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court resolved nil facial ebPLimes m
Lao S CA'orLv text amendments when Pie}' bold dm" me City ucmd no lint: its, Icumhmvc nrian.:
m ermomm the amendments ami Pmi the amendments vvem reasonably related lo lemtimatc
nmoltmvc tm.ecdvcs. Id.. *'? 16 and 27. Because tire amendments mere found to be mchdlv
valid, the S Overlay text amendments are not subject to any odmUonnl mcial chalieimes.
Seeoml. thetc is no Amis to: .Yl&Sm "a; applied11 chnden:ma. •\ie^b umue,; Pirn mrur Am,
.mpPed" cmPLimes "have never been litigated, have never been briefed Pa' 'bo PPiury have rc\n
been .named to the C'mmt. and have never been addressed or ceCucicdA (Piaintift s t Pijection m a •
\Pv.S alloeos that the,' have imremlved claims Lorn Case Nat. 0404U2U50. This action, hov-ev or
•o o eon-.dub-ted in Anna est 20 Pm o lout colitis;-] f >r ACCs nrepu'-ed a lair.; Mot: or: for (P'Opo
Cm^oPdalina, Com.-, mid ohmmed smnatmes from opposmu, coumeh '1 he Court cuusePmcod
VPCS's cases based in part on AfoPSN ropienematxn that diet: molten was made "ior .he reman:
p.ai Pmli cases ire enve eoniaiori i;.il- nions uf la'.v and that. (Joint .Mom ^i nar < m tun
Comnmdalioo Case A.
The Cily htm moeed Am summary judamem on all claims asserted m ma tn:nj;ioi::j
n Amnom ooum bod? PLimmYNami IPPmmP Motion; fm Summon .]...•:;: 1
• 'ot anonat mm too s.no ;osue to tmcide was \vnether tit;.1 anna r'onithai pro: ishais '.Tide >..rdhuao c
o- npphed to me \LvS propeity •se.ee 'valid. Prctcduml bac ;aoee:>-> has been .net m. tin- cme.
Pm mated abme. MmS had responded to the CityA APrmcn for summary pmmn.em ami i".:n Lm
apip.e opp-arttmity m areae all olTheir claim.-, m i'i'.n P.; tnemomndu and at oral .uymmem^ before
bus Conn •:•:; lancnry fh 2006. This Court has sumnmrly JLmiisee other ehPnis raised hv M.v*?.
Oihci 'Pisoipplied"' challenge* to dispate die City A rmht to staitniarv iudmmcm aduded to m
.v.eAS s Pvoieenon die n.ovv moot.
(ONCLLoSK)N
Am a nmitor oi law, the Court now emms the oreer '^meh the Chtv o.as cmPei. Mmmou omm s
objection is overruled.
/
aaAPoJ this _ y _oay of ApriP 20J6.
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